Lessons Learned or not Learned from the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 to the continued human catastrophe in Darfur

by

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Abstract:

On 7 April of this year, the world commemorated the 22nd anniversary of the beginning of the Rwandan Genocide, which took the lives of over 800,000 human beings in a little under 100 days. Twenty odd years later, what lessons has the International Community learned or not learned which can assist in preventing future genocides? The aim of this paper will be to identify the major failures of the Rwandan Genocide with a view to identifying some of the major lessons that may or may not have been learned by the International Community for preventing future genocides. The paper will identify four major failures in the areas of knowledge, will, means and the use of time. The failure of knowledge will focus on the failure to understand the history of Rwanda, the failure of intelligence to provide a clear understanding of the situation, threats and risks in Rwanda and the failure to build that knowledge to create an effective and flexible campaign plan that could have prevented or suppressed the genocide. The failure of will focuses on the failure of the International Community, individual nations, public opinion and militaries to marshal the necessary will to prevent or suppress the genocide. The failure of means will focus on the failure to provide the necessary human, financial and material resources to prevent or stop the genocide. The final failure to be examined will be the failure of the International Community to appreciate the time frames required for effective solutions in the near, mid and long term. The paper will conclude by summarizing these major lessons of the Rwandan Genocide and offering some suggestions for similar situations in the future.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE OF 1994?

INTRODUCTION

From April to July 1994, in a period of about 100 days, approximately 800,000 human beings were murdered in the Rwandan Genocide.[1] The International Community failed to prevent or suppress the Rwandan Genocide and largely stood by as bystanders while hundreds of thousands died in one of the fastest and deadliest genocides in history. In 2004, while the world commemorated the Rwandan Genocide and lamented its failure in Rwanda, yet again genocide has been exposed in Darfur, Sudan. This latest genocide has claimed up to 200,000 lives. In addition, 1.5 million people have been forced into inhuman physical conditions in refugee and displaced persons camps, which are claiming lives at a rate of up to 10,000 a month. [2] Will the International Community, including Canada, also fail to prevent or suppress the genocide in Sudan?

The aim of this paper is to identify the major lessons that the International Community should learn from the Rwandan Genocide, with a view to providing a list of questions to assist Canadian and other International policy and strategic decision makers as they consider our response to the genocide in Darfur. The paper will be presented in four parts. In part one, the crime of genocide will be defined and the response to genocide will be placed within the context of the policy known as the *Responsibility to Protect* and within a Clauswitzean based conceptual model of conflict resolution or limited war. In part two, an overview of the Rwandan genocide will be presented. In part three, the major lessons from the Rwandan genocide will be identified. In part four, questions for decision makers will be provided based on the lessons the international community should have learned from the Rwandan genocide. This paper assumes a basic understanding by the reader of the events of the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

BACKGROUND

Genocide is an old crime against humanity with a relatively new label. History is full of examples of one group of humans exterminating another group of human beings.

Examples of genocides include the destruction of the Melos in the Peloponnesian Wars, of Carthage by the Romans in the Punic wars, the Albigensian crusade, the Armenians during the First World War, the Ukrainians during the Stalin era and of course the Holocaust against the Jews, the Roma and other peoples during the Second World War.[3] During and immediately following the Holocaust, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jurist, invented the term genocide by combining the Greek work "genos", meaning a people or a tribe, with the Latin word "cide", meaning killing or murder. [4] The moral outrage of humanity, based upon the exposure of the holocaust, resulted in the Nuremberg Trials of 1945. Lemkin dedicated his life to lobbying the international community to recognize genocide as a distinct crime against humanity and enshrining in law the obligation to prevent, suppress and punish the perpetrators of this horrific crime. The triumph of his lobbying efforts, from 1943-1948, culminated in the adoption of the *International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* on 9 December 1948.[5] The Convention was ratified by the requisite number of nations and came into force on 12 January 1951. At present, approximately 142 nations have ratified the convention and firmly embedded the convention in international law.[6] However, since 1951, the convention has not prevented genocide as exemplified by the genocides, which have occurred in Burundi, Iran, Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia etc.[7] It has only been used to justify the suppression of one genocide, namely Kosovo in 1999.[8] In addition, it was not until 1998 that the first punishment for the crime of genocide was obtained with the conviction of Jean Paul Akayesu for his participation in the Rwandan genocide.[9] The convention, while firmly established in International Law and International Jurisprudence, has had a checkered record of actually preventing, suppressing and punishing the crime of genocide.

The convention "confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which, they (the contracting parties) undertake to prevent and to punish". It further states that genocide means "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

a. by killing members of the group;

b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and/or

e. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group".[10]

The convention defines acts of genocide as actually:

a. committing genocide;

b. conspiracy to commit genocide;

c. direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

d. attempting to commit genocide; and

e. complicity in genocide.[11]

In Article VIII of the convention, any contracting party "may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations (specifically Chapter 7) as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide" as presented above.[12]

After the genocide in Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council upon investigating the events in Rwanda concluded that genocide had in fact taken place and established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to punish the key perpetrators of the genocide.[13] In addition, individuals like President Bill Clinton,[14]former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali,[15] former Secretary-General Koffi Annan[16] and commissions of inquiry by the United Nations,[17] the Organization of African Unity[18] and Human Rights Watch[19] admitted that genocide took

place in Rwanda and that the International Community had failed to live up to its responsibility, in accordance with the convention, to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide.

Partially in response to the failure to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide, and in direct response to the challenge to address this issue by Secretary-General Koffi Annan in September 2000 in his millennium report, *We, the Peoples;* [20]the Government of Canada commissioned the *Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* to conduct a comprehensive examination of the relationship between humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty.[21] The commission completed its work in 2001 and the report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* was presented to the Secretary General and the United Nations on 18 December 2001. This document and the policy it articulates has been adopted by Canada as a key component in the International Policy Review. The intention to adopt this policy was best articulated in the address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at the United Nations on 22 September 2004. [22]

The Responsibility to Protect, or as it is more commonly known *R2P*'s, central theme "is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states".[23] This policy encourages and justifies firstly, the use of non-battle means like diplomacy, development and humanitarian aid, international condemnation and restrictions like embargoes, travel bans, freezing assets, sanctions etc., commissions of inquiry and traditional chapter 6 peacekeeping operations.[24] If non-battle means are not effective in preventing or suppressing the humanitarian catastrophe, then the report recommends moving to battle means as a tool of last resort, like armed humanitarian intervention, sanctioned to use military force to prevent and suppress these crimes against humanity like genocide. It was clear from the report and the background papers to the report, that the commission understood that Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter would need to be invoked to provide the mandate for the intervention and that a combat capable force with robust rules of engagement must be employed to suppress the genocide by fighting if necessary.[25]

To place the escalation of R2P within a conceptual model, Clausewitz, in his masterpiece *On War*, provided a conceptual model of war based on two types of wars.[26] The first type was an unlimited or total war policy in which political objectives would be achieved through a strategy of annihilation, through campaigns at the operational level of war of maneuver and/or attrition and by battles at the tactical level using fire and movement to win the decisive battle of annihilation and achieve victory.

The second type of war was limited war or as we could label it today a policy of conflict resolution, where the political objectives are achieved using a bi-polar strategy of a non-battle pole and/or a battle pole. In the non-battle pole, the state seeks to use diplomacy, development and humanitarian aid, economic assistance, information operations, observer or peacekeeping missions etc. as actions to achieve its policy objectives without resorting to the offensive use of force. The other pole in the bi-polar strategy is the battle pole, which can be used to wage a campaign of maneuver or attrition, either separately or in conjunction with non-battle means, to achieve the desired political objectives. At the tactical level the use of fire and movement remains the tool to achieve battlefield successes in support of the overall campaign plan and ultimately the achievement of policy objectives.[27]

Since the end of the Cold War, the International Community in general and Canada in particular, have clearly confined themselves to the limited war side of the paradigm using a bi-polar strategy to deal with threats to international peace and security. The preference of Canada and most other states, including many of our traditional allies, in line with the *Responsibility to Protect* policy, is to first use and exhaust all elements of a non-battle pole strategy. Only when those means have clearly failed, has Canada and other middle powers turned to the use of the battle pole if policy objectives merit the use of force as a last resort. In some cases such as Gulf War One, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the Government of Canada and a substantial number of its traditional allies have demonstrated the resolve to use force in a battle pole strategy to achieve their policy objectives. In other cases, such as Rwanda, Canada, its traditional allies and the wider International Community as represented by the United Nations, did not use the battle pole, but confined their response to genocide to a non-battle strategy. The use of this non-battle pole strategy in Rwanda did not prevent or suppress the genocide, which was allowed to run its course and claimed the lives of approximately 800,000 people.[28] A conceptual model is presented by Dr Lorne Bentley Contemporary Issues if Officership. [29]

As the situation in Darfur developed, the catastrophe in that nation has been labeled genocide by the Bush Administration, by large parts of the media and by nongovernmental organizations like Genocide Watch.[30] To date, the efforts to confront the genocide have been limited to a non-battle pole strategy including quiet and public diplomacy, media exposure and condemnation, humanitarian assistance, deployment of an observer mission and preparation of a traditional chapter 6 type peacekeeping mission and the threat of sanctions. Since these actions were taken, there has not been, according to government, non-government and media sources any change in the behavior of the Government of Sudan.[31] The Government of Sudan is either unwilling or unable to prevent or suppress the genocide and in accordance with the *Genocide Convention* and the *Responsibility to Protect* policy, the International Community,

including Canada, must now consider whether and when they will assume the responsibility to protect the victims in Darfur by preventing and suppressing the genocide. If non-battle pole actions continue to have no affect, at some point in the near future, policy and strategic decision makers must confront the question of whether they will have to move to the battle pole and conduct a humanitarian intervention, using military force to stop the genocide in Darfur or whether they will continue to follow a failed strategy in the non-battle pole. However, before such a decision is taken, it would be useful to examine the failure of the non-battle pole strategy of the International Community and its failure to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide. Such an examination will provide lessons that can be learned from that failure, which could assist in determining how best to proceed with a bi-polar strategy towards Darfur.

THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE OF 1994

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was preceded by a three-year civil war, which ended the previous year in August of 1993 with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The Arusha Agreement was signed by the parties to the conflict, namely the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front on 4 August 1993. This peace agreement called upon the International Community to provide a Neutral International Force to assist in the implementation of that agreement which would end the war, establish a Broad Based Transitional Government, conduct a complete demobilization of the military and police forces of the parties, end human rights abuses, create a new national army and gendarmerie and finally conduct a national election, which it was hoped would establish a multi-party liberal democracy abiding by the rule of law in the nation.[32] As the Organization of African Unity refused to provide the Neutral International Force, citing the lack of financial resources and experience, the United Nations was invited to provide the force and assist the people of Rwanda in their pursuit of peace, democracy and human rights.[33]

In July 1993, General Romeo Dallaire of Canada was appointed, at first to lead a small observer mission, later the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda and finally he was appointed the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). General Dallaire was provided with no information or expertise on the mission area or the background to the conflict by the Government of Canada and when he deployed to New York he received only the most tertiary information on the history, culture and recent conflict in Rwanda. He was expected to gather for himself the knowledge and expertise in order to identify the root causes of the conflict, which had severely damaged Rwanda both politically, economically and socially by the war.[34]

During the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in August/September 1993, General Dallaire requested current intelligence, but was denied or given very limited access to the information available to many of the key international players in Rwanda, namely the United States, France and Belgium amongst others. Without background knowledge of the history and culture of Rwanda and without timely, accurate and relevant intelligence about the current players, agendas and situation on the ground, General Dallaire literally went into the mission as a "blind man". The effect of this lack of knowledge was a lack of understanding of the artificial, but deep politically initiated and exploited ethnic divisions in the nation. He was also not made aware of the existence of a shadowy extremist group within the Rwandan Government, which had no intention of implementing the peace agreement and only feigned support while it prepared for the apocalypse. There was also a failure to appreciate that the moderate members of the government, who were lobbying and presenting a positive picture of the Arusha agreement, were in fact in a weak and vulnerable position and fully aware of the extremists and their agenda. These moderates did not share this information with General Dallaire for fear of losing their only hope for international assistance to create a power shift in their favor in Rwanda.[35]

Based on this lack of knowledge of Rwanda's past and in the absence of current intelligence information, the mission that was conceived was a traditional chapter 6 peacekeeping operation with light equipment, defensive rules of engagement and no intelligence gathering capability, when in fact what was required was a more robust mission capable of not only keeping but enforcing the Arusha Peace Agreement.[36]

In addition to this misconception on the military security side, the mission was not provided with skilled and experienced experts or input in the political, economic, humanitarian or human rights domains. The result of this lack of expertise was a plan conceived largely as a military operation that ignored the requirement for a longer term integrated and comprehensive political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and security campaign plan to address the root causes of the conflict and enable the nation to transition from a brutal and corrupt military dictatorship into a fully functioning democracy with a viable economy.[37]

Upon returning to New York in September 1993 to lobby for approval of the mission, General Dallaire was confronted with an absence of political will amongst member states, especially the big five on the Security Council and even amongst bureaucrats within the secretariat. The focus of these diplomats and the UN Secretariat was on the situations in Somalia and the Balkans, combined with the horrendous debt

situation confronting the UN. With the exception of France and Belgium, there was little if any interest in Rwanda, its situation and its requirements. Nations were fatigued with peacekeeping missions and the costs they entailed. In addition, as nations in the aftermath of the cold war were rapidly reducing their military's to address deficit situations and redirect resources to domestic social programs, there was little appetite for "yet another" peacekeeping mission in a nation where few if any international players had any interests other then humanitarian. Largely due to the lobbying of key members of the Secretariat like Koffi Annan, General Dallaire and a joint delegation from the parties in Rwanda, support for the mission was finally achieved.[38]However, the force structure was set at the minimum viable level of 2500 troops; the mission was expected to be "fast, cheap and bloodless". Major western nations, including Canada, refused to send contingents. Only Belgium, the former colonial power, was prepared to contribute well led, trained, equipped and supported troops. Despite reluctance at using forces of the former colonial power, they had to be accepted because there were no other contingents available. The mission was restricted to defensive rules of engagement, with an assistance or restricted peacekeeping mandate, within very narrow time and cost limits. Use of force, for any reason other than self-defense, was prohibited. Finally, the mission was directed to seek financial economies, which became the "gospel" for denying even minimal financial and logistical support to the mission. This mission was simply not a major issue or vital national security interest of the international community, of most individual nations, of public opinion or even of most military's who were directed to provide contingents. Indeed, third world contingents such as Bangladesh sent ad hoc units or like Ghana and Tunisia poorly trained and equipped units for the "training experience" and in the hope of acquiring operational experience and equipment on what was perceived to be a "safe" traditional peacekeeping mission.[39]

Upon approval of the mandate in October 1993, General Dallaire deployed to Rwanda and over the next four months his force deployed despite severe financial, logistical and equipment shortfalls. The force was desperately short of vehicles and communications equipment. The contingents deployed with no reserve stocks of water, food, ammunition, medical supplies, general and technical stores or spare parts expecting the UN to provide all reserve stocks, which it was financially unable to provide. While the force reached its peak manpower level by April of 1994, it never approached even a minimum state of operational effectiveness.[40]

Concurrent with the deployment of the "toothless tiger" of UNAMIR, the political process stalemated and the security situation began to deteriorate from late November 1993 until the resumption of hostilities and the outbreak of genocide in April 1994. Assassinations, massacres, increasing ethnic propaganda, recruiting, training and arming of militia groups and general destabilization became the order of the day.

Pleas from UNAMIR for reinforcement and financial/logistics support were refused. In addition, a number of moderate informants stepped forward and warned UNAMIR of the plans for genocide under the cover of a renewal of hostilities. When General Dallaire lobbied for more aggressive preemptive actions by UNAMIR, his request was denied and the UN and major powers confirmed their intention of using the non-battle pole only. No contingency plans or preparations were made if diplomacy, aid, economic threats, media condemnation or peacekeeping failed. The failure to use force as sanctioned in the Arusha Peace Agreement and the Kigali Weapons Secure Area Agreement with the parties, directly resulted in the inability of UNAMIR to prevent the genocide.[41]

On 6 April 1994, the President of Rwanda was killed when his plane was shot down at Kigali Airport. Within 24 hours, in what was obviously a well planned and prepared operation, all of the moderate leaders in Rwanda, including Tutsis and Hutus, were either murdered or in hiding. UNAMIR was directed not to intervene and its rules of engagement on the morning of 7 April were restricted to using force in self-defense only. Combined with national direction to contingents that they were to place all efforts on force protection and avoid any use of force with the belligerents, UNAMIR was relegated to the status of a bystander. With the inability of "the toothless tiger" to influence the situation on the ground, the Rwandan Patriotic Front resumed hostilities that day and would continue its military campaign until it achieved victory in July 1994. However, behind the resumption of hostilities, a more sinister operation was in progress, namely a deliberate campaign of genocide to exterminate every Tutsis in Rwanda. While the word genocide was not used, the reports from UNAMIR, the media and embassy's during those early days in April document the rapid implementation of the plan of genocide.[42]

General Dallaire quickly called for reinforcement of the mission, logistical support and a mandate to stop the killing.[43] His requests were denied and in fact the debate within the International Community was not whether to move to a battle pole, since the non-battle pole had clearly failed, but in fact the discussions were all about abandoning Rwanda. Belgium, which initially had called for reinforcement, about faced and supported by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and reluctantly by France and China, called for a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR and the abandonment of the Rwandan people to their fate. [44]

The only attempt at an intervention was the arrival of one of the finest and most elite western military forces, which within three days deployed approximately 2,000 U.S. marines, French and Belgian Paratroopers and Italian Special Forces to Rwanda and its environs.[45] However, their mission was not to reinforce UNAMIR or to intervene to

save lives in Rwanda; they were deployed only to evacuate foreign nationals (read white people) from Rwanda. The speed of this action would forever kill the lame excuse that the military force to intervene could not be assembled. In fact it was assembled and deployed within 72 hours, but not for the purpose for which it should have been deployed. With the evacuation complete, the calls for complete evacuation of UNAMIR and the abandonment of the Rwandan people intensified. It was only due to the lobbying of international human rights groups, the non-aligned members of the Security Council and others that the decision was finally taken to reduce, but not to withdraw UNAMIR. However, the new mandate of 17 April 1994 only provided for a force of 270 personnel and provided no authority or means to intervene to save lives in Rwanda.[46]

Regardless of the mandate, UNAMIR eventually took under its protection up to 40,000 Rwandans and protected them with a force of 454 soldiers. UNAMIR was restricted in the use of force to self-defense only and given its tenuous logistical situation and its lack of combat capability it never had the ability to intervene to stop the genocide. Most days it merely tried to survive to the next day. Without a battle pole mandate and capability, genocide could not be suppressed in Rwanda.[47]

As awareness of the genocide, largely generated by the media increased, calls for a humanitarian intervention, particularly by African states, increased.[48] Fearing the obligation to intervene, within a hostile domestic environment, the United States and other nations refused to acknowledge that genocide was taking place and instead adopted a policy of “wait and see”.[49] Finally, under enormous public and international pressure, the Security Council approved UNAMIR II on 17 May 1994.[50] However, the force never deployed. Delayed, largely by the United States, for financial, logistical and equipment reasons, not a single contingent of the intervention force arrived in Rwanda until after the genocide was ended by the victory of the RPF on 17 July 1994.[51] UNAMIR II arrived not to suppress genocide, but to count the bodies and assist the survivors. An intervention that required deployment, like the evacuation of the expatriates, in days and weeks, took months and in fact the entire UNAMIR II force which was supposed to be deployed in 5 weeks took 5 months to complete its full deployment. In addition, a mandate, which could then be seen as requiring years to achieve, was confined to months. No attempt was made to develop a long-term comprehensive plan to rebuild Rwanda.[52]

The experience of UNAMIR in Rwanda is a clear example of the failure of a nonbattle pole strategy to prevent or even suppress genocide. What was clearly needed and now is widely acknowledged, is that a battle pole strategy, after the failure of all nonbattle means, was required to suppress the Rwandan genocide. The failure to

even consider a battle strategy resulted in one of the worst genocides in modern history and in what the Organization of African United has labeled “the preventable genocide”.[53]

LESSONS FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE OF 1994

Today, as we continue to observe the genocide in Darfur are there lessons that we can learn from the Rwandan Genocide to assist our decision makers as we consider our response to this latest genocide?

First, it should be confirmed if in fact genocide is taking place in Darfur? According to President Bush, Colin Powell, Genocide Watch and numerous others genocide is taking place in Darfur. However, genocide is an abused term and does in fact have a precise legal meaning in accordance with the Genocide Convention.

The convention states that genocide is “the intention to destroy in whole or in part members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such”. The people of Darfur are black Africans with distinct tribal and ethnic affiliations that constitute them as being members of ethnic and racial groups. Secondly, genocide is committed by “killing, causing serious body or mental harm, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group and or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. The Janjaweed militia has killed tens of thousands of human beings in Darfur, it has subjected men to execution, women to gang rape and branding and abducted children, which it is alleged are being sold into slavery. In addition, it has destroyed homes, wells, farms, and crops to displace the population to camps inside and outside Sudan. These camps are located in desert areas, with the most extreme weather conditions, without access to water, food, shelter or medical support. Given these well-documented facts, these acts of genocide meet the requirement for defining the situation in Darfur as genocide.[54] Under the Genocide Convention, the contracting parties, including Canada, are obliged “to take such action under the UN Charter as they consider appropriate to prevent and suppress these acts of genocide”. Therefore, it can be concluded that genocide is taking place in Darfur and that the international community, including Canada, has a legal, in addition to a moral, obligation to intervene.[55]

A second key question is who has the responsibility to protect the people of Darfur? In accordance with the *Responsibility to Protect* policy, a government, which is unwilling or unable to prevent or stop a preventable catastrophe, including genocide, has abdicated its responsibility to protect its citizens to the international community, which assumes the right under the genocide convention to intervene to prevent and suppress genocide. A humanitarian intervention into Darfur is totally consistent with as an example the Canadian policy of a *Responsibility to Protect*.[56]

A third question is what type of strategy should we employ to stop the genocide in Darfur? Canada and its allies have pursued a bi-polar strategy confined to the non-battle pole. Efforts as previously listed have been initiated, but have not to date changed the behavior of the Government of the Sudan and the genocide continues. We should not be surprised. For 40 years, the regimes in Khartoum have employed genocide as a tool in their ethnic, racial and religious consolidation of power. For 40 years, Christians in the south of Sudan were subjected to genocide. In the 1980's the Dinka people were almost exterminated in genocide. In the 1990's the Nuba people were almost exterminated in yet another genocide. The Governments of Sudan, with virtual immunity, have repeatedly resorted to genocide as a matter of domestic policy that has claimed the lives of up to 2 million of their citizens.[57] It is unlikely that they will change their behavior until they believe that, this time; the international community is serious and the government of Sudan recognizes that they have more to lose than to gain by continuing a policy of genocide in Darfur. What this may require is a shift to the battle pole and the successful execution of a humanitarian intervention, using military force to suppress the genocide. However, before such a shift from the non-battle to the battle pole is considered or conducted, it might be wise to examine some lessons from the Rwandan genocide to ensure that such a shift is realistic and can be effective.

The major lessons of the Rwandan genocide can be assembled into four groups, under the headings of knowledge, will, means and time.

KNOWLEDGE

The first major group of lessons can be attributed to a lack of knowledge about the past, the present and the future of Rwanda. The lack of knowledge about the history of Rwanda, of the culture of Rwanda, of the false "Hamitic myth" of Tutsis and Hutus as two tribes in perpetual conflict and the failure to understand the political and economic roots of the conflict directly contributed to the failure to understand the

conflict, which turned into genocide. The ignorance of Rwanda by virtually every non-Rwandan decision-maker during this crisis could hardly provide the foundation upon which to build a solution to the problems in Rwanda. [58]Decision makers cannot expect to be part of the solution if they do not understand the problem.

In order for a decision maker to make timely, accurate and relevant decisions in order to take effective actions, he requires timely, accurate and relevant information, commonly referred to as intelligence. The failure to effectively gather, analyze with expertise and disseminate to all concerned, even the most basic pieces of information or intelligence placed UNAMIR and international decision makers in the position of never seizing the initiative and always being caught in an information decision cycle that was reacting to the extremist perpetrators of the genocide. Knowledge of the present and near future is essential to any decision maker and the failure to acquire that knowledge in Rwanda directly contributed to the genocide. Decision makers cannot solve a problem without timely, relevant and accurate information.

The final lesson under the heading of “knowledge” was the lack of a plan for the future of Rwanda. Peacekeeping in too many cases has been an attempt to treat an infected ulcer with a band-aid. While it covers up the infection and can give the appearance of normalcy, in fact the infection, if not cured, will only resurface. Haiti is a classic example of the failure to address the underlying economic, political and social causes of violence in that society and how the failure to address those causes has led to yet another intervention in 2004, when the operations of the 90’s supposedly cured the disease. In order to suppress genocide, not just the acts of violence must be suppressed, but the root causes of the genocide must be determined and they must also be addressed. They must be addressed with an integrated, comprehensive, long term political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights plan that incorporates and subordinates a military/security component to solve the root causes of the conflict, which created the genocide. The failure to bring together the experts with the knowledge to create and implement such a plan only places a band-aid on the conflict, which will resurrect itself at some point in the future. The current genocidal conflicts and wars in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, which have claimed the lives of at least 4 million people since 1996 with no end in site, had their roots in the failure to address the root causes of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. There has to be an effective solution in the form of a longterm plan to solve the underlying causes of the problem.

WILL

The second major group of lessons can be classified under “will”. The failure to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide has often been blamed on a lack of will by the international community to risk casualties in a conflict in which they had no vital national security interests. The failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide, especially in May and June of 1994, when sufficient evidence confirmed that a genocide was taking place demonstrated the inability of the international community to marshal the will to intervene.

In addition to this lack of international will, was the absence of national will as it was easier for political leaders of many nations to make great pontificating speeches, but then abstain from committing the means to actually conduct an intervention. It was easier to lay the blame on the UN, on UNAMIR and on the United States than to make the hard decision and assume the risks of intervention. In many cases this was due to the lack of public will in individual nations for humanitarian intervention. Few people in the world had ever heard of Rwanda and certainly did not identify it as something that was vital to their security and prosperity. Public opinion could only have been raised by effective political leadership, which was sorely lacking in 1994. Political leadership had to be prepared to expend political capital in support of intervention.

Finally, the lack of military will at the Pentagon and other national military headquarters opposed US military involvement in Rwanda as did the overwhelming majority of US and allied military officers. In their cold war view at the time and still strong today, military’s exist to fight and win the nations wars and must train, equip and prepare for major wars against definable enemies in support of vital national interests. They believe that military’s should not be squandered on sideshows like peacekeeping and intervening in an unimportant area of the world in someone else’s conflict. This attitude was prevalent in most major military’s in 1994 and persists in hard core combattants to this day. The failure to marshal international, national, public and military will to intervene in Rwanda to suppress the genocide directly contributed to success of the genocide.

MEANS

The third group of lessons can be assembled until the heading of “means”. An anonymous spokesman during the Rwandan genocide stated “Where political will is absent the means will seldom be found”. Even if political will can be marshaled, a shift to the battle pole can only take place if the means to intervene are available. There were four key “means” which were absent before and during the Rwandan genocide.

Non-battle pole means like diplomacy, aid and peacekeeping cost money. Intervention will cost more money. Rebuilding after a genocide will cost even more money. There must exist the financial resources to conduct the strategy decided by the decision makers. Such activities cannot be done on the cheap without risking mission success and the lives of the rescuers and the victims.

The second component of means is the actual military force to conduct a humanitarian intervention. Three requirements became apparent in Rwanda and that is that the force would need to deploy rapidly, operate effectively in a combat environment with protection, mobility and firepower and be sustained indefinitely. With the exception of the United States, and to a lesser degree a few other major powers, no other nations possessed such a capability in 1994. Their "heavy" or conscript forces could not be mobilized with the speed to deploy in days or weeks, they were not trained to roll right into a combat environment in the middle of Africa and they could not be logistically sustained indefinitely at this end of the earth. The reluctance of the US to intervene, and its withholding of the means like equipment, training and transport from poorer but willing nations, prevented the shift to a timely and effective humanitarian intervention. A force in being that can deploy rapidly, operate effectively in a combat environment and be sustained indefinitely is the essential component of a credible humanitarian intervention.

The third means that was lacking was the reluctance to use force to prevent or suppress the Rwandan genocide. From UNAMIR I to UNAMIR II, the international community did not want to use force to prevent or stop the genocide. The demonstration that the international community was prepared to use military force to stop the genocide may have deterred the genocidiares and halted the genocide. However, in a worst case scenario, the use of force may have actually been required to stop the killers, disarm militias, open humanitarian routes, overwhelm killers, defend against attacks etc., which in each case would have involved the spilling of "blood". The reluctance to approve the use of force bound the arms of UNAMIR and turned it into a "toothless tiger", which could not even bluff the killers. The lesson from Rwanda is that humanitarian intervention to suppress genocide will require the will and the means to use force when it is required.

The final means that was denied was the abhorrence of taking casualties in a humanitarian intervention. The death of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu in Somalia in October 1993 hung over UNAMIR in what was termed in the mission "the Somalia syndrome".[58] Force protection and not taking risks that could endanger the lives of

soldiers was a premium constantly pressed on General Dallaire. The withdrawal of the Belgians after losing 10 soldiers, the withdrawal of other national contingents in fear for their lives and the reluctance of the International Community, especially the northern developed nations, to risk casualties in itself doomed the option of moving to the battle pole.[59] If a force is prepared to use force and "spill blood" for a mission, that force may also be required to "shed blood" and the international community, individual nations, their publics and the soldiers on the ground must understand this risk. The International Community was more comfortable with words and warnings than with shedding blood to stop a genocide. Most national leaders, with the notable exception of African leaders, were terrified of the thought of justifying casualties to their citizens and possibly facing a domestic backlash. And so Peacekeeping was essentially handed down by the Northern developed countries and dumped unceremoniously to the Southern developing countries by simply walking out or saying NO to DPKO at the UN Headquarters.

TIME

The final group of lessons can be placed under the heading of "time". In business it is often stated that time is money. In genocide, time is lives. The killing in Rwanda at its peak in late April and early May 1994 reached the level of eight to ten thousand murdered each day.[60] Every day of delay in a genocide costs the lives of human beings. Deployment of the intervention force and its launch into operations on the ground must be measured in days and weeks, not months in the near-term.

In the mid-term, stabilizing and commencing reconstruction after a genocide will take years not the usual three or six month mandates normally envisioned. UNAMIR II lasted for 2 years in Rwanda before it was withdrawn and never even came close to fulfilling its mid-term mission.[61]

Finally, in the long term, in order to solve the underlying root causes of genocide, it will take decades and not years to reconstruct a viable and humane society. The failure in the 1960's to address the early outbreaks of genocide in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Congo, with a long term reconstruction plan, have sentenced the Great Lakes Region of Africa to semi-annual genocides that have claimed millions of lives and will continue to claim lives until the root causes of genocide in this region are addressed.[62]

In the near term we need to react within in days and weeks vice months, in the mid term our tasks will take years not months and in the long term our engagement will take decades not years in order to be effective in preventing future genocides.

In summary, decision makers need to understand the situation with knowledge of the past, present and develop a plan for the future. They must marshal the international, national, public and military will to conduct a humanitarian intervention. They must have and commit the means to accomplish the mission. These include the financial resources, the clear understanding that the use of force will be required, the military force capable of using force and the acknowledgement that despite all efforts, friendly casualties are inevitable. These decision makers must also understand the importance of time. In the near term they need to act rapidly but the mid and long term requirements must be realistically measured in terms of years and decades of commitment.

QUESTIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS RESPONDING TO THE DARFUR GENOCIDE

Based on these lessons that we should have learned from the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and given the current genocide in Darfur, are we ready today to intervene and stop this current genocide? To date our response and efforts have been confined to the non-battle pole and have not changed the behavior of the genocidal regime in Khartoum. We have failed to prevent the genocide in Darfur.

At some point, hopefully in the near future, if non-battle efforts do not stop that genocide, the decision may have to be taken to move to the battle pole and conduct an armed humanitarian intervention, sanctioned and capable of using force to stop the genocide. However, before such a decision is taken the following questions, based on lessons we should have learned from Rwanda, may be of assistance to International and Canadian policy and strategic level decision makers.

We should not launch into a humanitarian intervention out of naive, unrealistic idealism, but only after we have exhausted all non-battle pole efforts and are left with no alternative than to use force. The decision to use force should not be taken lightly. It will inevitably result in the deaths of human beings, including possibly our own troops and such a decision should only be taken with the full awareness of what is required to

ensure that such use of force is ultimately successful.

KNOWLEDGE

1. Do we understand the history, culture and the root causes of this genocide? We cannot contribute to the solution if we do not understand the problem.

2. Do we have the best available, relevant, timely and accurate information upon which to base our planning, decision-making and operations? You have to have timely, relevant and accurate information to make timely accurate and relevant decisions and to take effective actions.

3. Do we have an integrated and comprehensive political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and security campaign plan to solve the root causes of the genocide? If the root causes are not solved, then we are merely "placing a band aid on an infection".

WILL

4. Have we assembled a multi-national coalition of the willing who are committed and prepared to see this humanitarian intervention through to its successful conclusion? Where political will is absent, the means for success will seldom be found.

5. Have we prepared the nation to support this humanitarian intervention? The political leaders and the government must be committed to support the mission, because they truly believe it is the only option, it is right and it is important.

6. Have we prepared the public for the mission? The public must understand and support the intervention and understand that it will ultimately cost us "treasure and blood", but that this cost is morally and legally necessary.

7. Have we prepared the military for the mission? The military from its most senior levels to its most junior members must understand that what they are being called upon to do and to sacrifice is right, it is important and that the nation will support them throughout this mission.

MEANS

8. Are we prepared to expend a large amount of financial resources on this mission? These missions cannot be conducted “on the cheap”. There will

be an enormous financial cost and the nation must be able and willing to expend that money because they believe it is the right thing to do.

9. Are we prepared, in a worst-case scenario (e.g. an opposed intervention) to use force, which means fighting and which means “killing and spilling blood” to achieve our objectives within the law? The authority and the means to use force is essential if the humanitarian intervention is to be expected to suppress the genocide with all available means.

10. Do we have the multi-purpose combat capable force, trained and prepared to deploy rapidly, operate effectively in a combat environment and be sustained indefinitely? Humanitarian Intervention, in order to suppress genocide, must not only be willing to use force it must be capable of using force.

11. Has the coalition, the government, the public and the military been prepared to take casualties? If the mission is prepared to “fight and spill blood” than it must also be prepared to “shed blood”.

TIME

12. Can we deploy and be prepared to operate and sustain operations within days and weeks? Time is lives and when the decision to go to the battle pole is taken every minute saves lives.

13. In the mid- term are we prepared to sustain our battle and non-battle pole efforts for years? Suppressing genocide takes time, as does the responsibility to rebuild and prevent resurrection of the genocide.

14. In the long term are we prepared to invest resources for decades to solve the root causes of the genocide? Suppressing genocide, rebuilding the nation and preventing future outbreaks of genocide requires solutions to the root causes of the genocide, which will take decades to realize.

In summary, these questions and more importantly the affirmative answers to these questions, will ensure that if the decision is taken to go to the battle pole and conduct a humanitarian intervention to suppress the genocide in Darfur, this decision will be an informed decision. Such a decision will ensure that the coalition, the nation, the public and the men and women in uniform are provided with the knowledge, the will, the means and time to achieve this mission.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this paper has confirmed that the crime of genocide is still occurring in Darfur and that in accordance with the *Genocide Convention* and in accordance with the policy of the *Responsibility to Protect*, Canada and a coalition of like-minded nations, have a responsibility to prevent and suppress that genocide. In accordance with prudence, escalation and the policy of R2P, our response to date has been to use non-battle pole efforts to prevent and suppress the genocide still with classic peacekeeping tools. Should these efforts continue to fail or stagnate with the hybrid AU/UN missions, at some point the decision could be taken to move to the battle pole and to conduct a humanitarian intervention to stop the genocide by any means necessary. Before such a decision is taken, the 14 major lessons from the Rwandan genocide presented in this paper should be considered and the questions they pose should be answered in the affirmative. This must be done so that a coalition of the willing, and most importantly for the men and women in uniform, who are called upon to put their lives on the line to suppress this genocide, are fully aware of exactly what is involved to conduct a successful humanitarian intervention.

Endnotes

[1] Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995) 261-265. Prunier was the first scholar to investigate the numbers killed in the Rwandan Genocide and concluded that the number was between 800,000 and 850,000. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) 1. Human Rights Watch commissioned a later and more extensive investigation that concluded that no less than 500,000 were killed in the Genocide. There is considerable debate amongst scholars and bureaucrats on the exact number that were killed and the conclusion of most is that we will never know for sure. Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide* (Addis: Organization of African Unity Press, 2000) Chapter14 page 80, supports this conclusion and sets the number as no less than 500,000 and more likely up to 800,000. 800,000 has become the most generally agreed upon number of the victims of the Rwandan Genocide.

[2] Gregory Stanton, *Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan* (http://www.genocidewatch.org/Never%20Again.htm : Genocide Watch, April 2, 2004) 1-3. Genocide Watch, the most independent and credible genocide monitoring organization in the world concluded in April in this paper that genocide was taking place in Darfur. Sudan Tribune, *African Mediators seek to bring Darfur rebel commander to peace talks* (Khartoum: Sudan Tribune, Oct 23 2004) 1-3 updates the numbers of killed to that date as 70,000 and the number of displaced and refugees at 1.5 million.

[3] Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990) 65-377. This seminal work on Genocide provides within those page limits case studies of 14 genocides from the Melos of Ancient Greece to the Holocaust.

[4] Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944) 79-80. Lemkin invented the word genocide and made an initial attempt to define the word, which has been modified by the genocide convention, scholars and various national laws.

[5] William Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 553-558. Schabas dedicates the first two chapters of his book to the efforts to develop the Genocide Convention and in the pages noted above provides the first two drafts of the convention and the final convention, which were adopted into International Law. Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 17-170. Power provides three chapters on the struggle to develop the genocide convention and then the struggle to get it ratified by nations like the United States.

[6] Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopia of Race and Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 9. Weitz research confirmed that by 2000, 142 countries had ratified the Genocide Convention and incorporated into the Criminal Codes.

[7] Chalk and Jonassohn 65-414. These scholars provide case studies of 14 genocides from antiquity to the holocaust and a further 6 genocides to 1990. There have been further genocides since then most notably Rwanda and now Darfur, Sudan.

[8] Richard Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the PostCold War World* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999) 13,164-167,173-179. Haass reviews the failure of the U.S. to prevent or suppress the Rwandan Genocide and the impetus this gave to the suppression of genocide in Kosovo.

[9] Schabas 112. Throughout, his book Schabas describes and returns to the Akeyescu case because it was the first conviction for the crime of genocide under the convention and establishes the precedent for further cases in International Jurisprudence.

[10] Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000) 249-255, 227-236. Melvern provides in the latter an analysis of the Genocide Convention in relation to the failure to prevent and suppress in Rwanda. In the former pages she provides a copy of the convention with a commentary.

[11] Schabas 565. Article III.

[12] Schabas 566. Article VIII.

[13] United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996* (New York: United

Nations Press, 1996) 387-394. Document 97 provided in this reference is Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) dated 8 November 1994, which established "an International Tribunal to prosecute those responsible for genocide and other serious violation of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994".

[14] CNN, *Clinton Meets Rwanda Genocide Survivors*

(http://www.cnn.com/World/9803/25/rwanda.clinton dated 23 October 2004) 1. This site provides a video and an audio tape of President Bill Clintons apology on 25 March 1998 to the Rwandan people for failing to prevent or suppress the genocide in Rwanda.

[15] United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996* 110-111. Boutros Ghali's conclusion to the "Blue Book" states that the International Community failed to prevent or suppress the genocide in Rwanda.

[16] BBC, UN Admits Rwanda Genocide Failure

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/714025.stm) 1-2. The United Nations Security Council accepted the Independent Inquiry conclusion that the Council, the Secretariat and the International Community had failed to prevent or suppress the Genocide in

Rwanda in 1994. Koffi Annan supported the admission.

[17] United Nations, *The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the*

United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (New York: United Nations Press,

1999) 59. This report clearly lays out the failure of the United Nations and the International Community to prevent or suppress the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

[18] Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (Addis: Organization of African United Press, 2000) 1. This was the best and most detailed of the post-genocide commissions of inquiry and concluded with volumes of evidence that the International Community had failed to live up to its moral and legal obligations under the genocide convention to prevent or suppress the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

[19] Human Rights Watch 16-26. Allison Des Forges in this brilliant investigative report supports with comprehensive evidence the accusation that the International Community failed to prevent or suppress the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

[20] Foreign Affairs Canada. *The Responsibility to Protect* (http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.aspdated 18 October 2004) Welcome page.

[21] The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) vii.

[22] Foreign Affairs Canada, The Responsibility to Protect (http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/media-en.aspdated 18 October 2004). Links are provided to the Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at the United Nations September 22, 2004 in

New York and the address by Prime Minister Paul Martin on the occasion of his visit to

Washington, D.C. on 29 April 2004 in Washington. In both of these addresses the Prime Minister stated R2P was Canadian policy.

[23] ICISS viii.

[24] ICISS 19-30. The R2P report presents a number of non-force options that it recommends should be used prior to using force under the headings of commitment to prevention, early warning and analysis, root cause prevention efforts, direct prevention efforts and measures short of military action. The authors clearly concluded that nonbattle means should first be attempted and exhausted before resorting to the use of force.

[25] ICISS 31-35, 57-66. The R2P report presents a series of section on the decision to intervene, the threshold criteria of just cause, other precautionary criteria and in the second pages group examines preventive operations, planning for military intervention, carrying out military intervention, following up military intervention and a doctrine for human protection operations.

[26] Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 75-99. Clausewitz described two types of war total or unlimited war and limited war.

[27] Bernd Horn, ed. *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000) 145-180. In this paper, Dr. Lorne Bentley provides a clausewitzean conceptual model of war.

[28] Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds. *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda*

Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000) 185-208. Adelman provides an excellent paper on the history of Canadian policy towards Rwanda before, during and after the genocide.

[29] Horn 176. Dr. Lorne Bentley has updated the diagram presented in this paper and graciously agreed to loan his updated version to this paper.

[30] Stanton 1-3.

[31] United Nations, *Security Council Resolution 1564 dated 18 September 2004* (New

York: United Nations Press, 2004) 1-4. This Security Council resolution passed 11-0 with 4 abstentions and under Chapter 7 of the charter accuses the Government of Sudan of continuing its campaign against civilians, orders an investigation into allegations of genocide and supported the expansion of the African Union monitoring force into a peacekeeping mission.

[32] United Nations, *The United Nations in Rwanda 1993-1996.* 169-202. Document 19 in the Blue Book provides a copy of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

[33] United Nations, *The United Nations in Rwanda 1993-1996* . 217-220. Document 21 in the Blue Book provides a report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning the Arusha Peace Agreement and the possible role for the United Nations in its implementation.

[34] Romeo Dallaire with Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003) 43-56.This chapter in Dallaire's book describes in detail the lack of information provided to him of Rwanda's history and culture and the near total absence of current intelligence.

[35] Dallaire 57-79. This chapter in Dallaire's book describes the impact of the lack of timely, relevant and fully accurate information during the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in August/September 1994 and how that lack of current information adversely impacted on the development of the mission.

[36] Dallaire 80-97. This chapter in Dallaire's book describes the lack of interest

in Rwanda at the United Nations and the major lobbying effort that had to be made just to get approval for a minimally effective or some might judge an inadequate mission.

[37] Dallaire 80-97. Dallaire's conclusions on what was required in Rwanda can be compared with the requirements as articulated by two prominent African scholars Josias Semujanga, *Origins of the Rwandan Genocide* (New York: Humanity Books, 2003) and Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) which provide much deeper and more accurate analysis of the root causes of the Rwandan genocide and what measures needed to be taken to prevent or suppress it.

[38] Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002) 49-73. Barnett was an academic on leave to the U.S. State Department and describes in these references the lack of interest in Rwanda and the restrictions placed upon the mission. Barnett offers an insiders view into the U.S. mission in New York and the internal workings of the United Nations Security Council and Secretariat before and during the genocide.

[39] United Nations, *The United Nations in Rwanda 1993-1996* 221-233. Document

23 in the Blue Book provides the proposed plan for the UNAMIR mission and Document 24 provides the actual Security Council Resolution 872 dated 5 October 1993 which established UNAMIR and provided its mandate.

[40] Dallaire 80-220. In these chapters Dallaire describes the on-going "battles" with New York and with national contingents with the resulting failure of the mission not being operationally effective by 7 April 1994.

[41] Melvern 82-96, 99-108. In these two short chapters, Linda Melvern provides a consolidated account of the efforts to act on informants information which were denied by UN Headquarters in New York and the disastrous impact they had on the credibility of UNAMIR and in not deterring the extremists from initiating their genocide plan.

[42] Dallaire 333,374,395,454 and Melvern 176-196 describe in detail the controversy over the use of the word genocide from the viewpoint of the mission, the media and nongovernmental organizations. Barnett 130-136 describes the controversy over the use of the word genocide in New York at the Security Council.

[43] Dallaire 271-327. This portion of Dallaire's book describes the back and forth negotiating between the mission at risk in the field and the headquarters in New York over reinforcements, mandate, logistics etc.

[44] Barnett 97-129. Barnett provides the inside account of the negotiating in New York on the future of UNAMIR and how the reduction of the force and the limitations on its mandate were conducted in New York.

[45] Melvern 1-4 describes the overt racism of the evacuation of expatriates, which abandoned Rwandans to their fate in the genocide. Dallaire 275-318 describes the capabilities and the potential of the International Intervention and the failure to use it to stop the genocide.

[46] United Nations, *The United Nations in Rwanda 1993-1996* 268-269. Document 52 in the Blue Book is Security Council Resolution 912 dated 21 April 1994, which downsized UNAMIR to 270 troops and restricted its mandate to monitoring, acting as an intermediary to obtain a ceasefire and assisting in humanitarian relief operations. Authors Note: The mission was downsized but, the withdrawal was halted by General Dallaire at 454 personnel on his own authority. His unilateral decision was never questioned by higher headquarters.

[47] Human Rights Watch 595-691. In this first class examination, Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch describes in detail the failure of the international community in its use of non-battle pole means only to suppress the genocide.

[48] Barnett 130-152. Barnett provides his insiders account of the desire by willing nations to intervene but the denial of the mandate or the means by other powers particularly the United States.

[49] Barnett 130-152. The use of the term “acts of genocide” instead of genocide was a deliberate policy by the United States and others in order to avoid the requirement under the Genocide Convention to intervene. Power 345-389 presents an examination of the “politics” in Washington surrounding the U.S. policy not only not to intervene but to actively thwart any other nation or groups of nations from intervening.

[50] United Nations, *The United Nations in Rwanda 1993-1996* 277-284. Document 61 is the report of the Secretary-General explaining a plan for UNAMIR II including the deployment of a 5500 man force in 5 weeks (it took 5 months). Document 62 is Security Council Resolution 918 dated 17 May 1994, which provided the mandate for UNAMIR

II.

[51] Dallaire 461-509 describes this period of waiting for UNAMIR II while the genocide continued until it was ended by the RPF victory on 17 July 1994. Dallaire also discusses the negative impact of the French Operation Tourqoise intervention which was nothing more than a cynical attempt to save their genocidal allies from total military defeat.

[52] Shaharyar Khan, *The Shallow Graves of Rwanda* (London: Tauris Publishers, 2001) 196-208. Khan was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNAMIR II, serving in Rwanda from July 1994 until the end of the mission in 1996. His book is an inside history of the mission at the end and after the genocide and in Chapter 10 he summarizes the failure to develop an integrated and comprehensive plan to rebuild Rwanda after the genocide.

[53] Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda 1. The report was entitled *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide* which is the meticulously substantiated conclusion of their investigation.

[54] Gregory Stanton, *Genocide Emergency: Darfur, Sudan*

(http://www.genocidewatch.org/Never%20Again.htm : Genocide Watch, April 2, 2004) provides the report of genocide watch and its conclusion that genocide is taking place in Darfur.

[55] Schabas 566. Article VIII of the convention calls upon “the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide”. Chalk and Jonassohn 48-50. Canada ratified the Genocide Convention on 28 November 1949 and entered it into the Criminal Code of Canada in Bills C34 and C35 under Section 281.1 (1), (2), (3), (4).

[56] ICISS xi-xiii. Provides a synopsis and the principles for humanitarian intervention.

[57] Alex de Waal, Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000) 37-39, 42, 45-46, 49-50, 54, 56, 60, 69, 73. The author describes the genocides in the Sudan and the use of acts of genocide by the regimes in Sudan in conjunction with a wider examination of the phenomenon of genocide in Africa.

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